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Abstract 
Past research has demonstrated that verbally recalling the appearance of a perpetrator 
after witnessing a crime can hinder one’s ability to identify that perpetrator in a 
subsequent lineup (verbal overshadowing; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).  A 
recent study by Chan, Thomas, and Bulevich (2009) revealed that taking an initial 
memory test for an event increases one’s susceptibility to later misleading information.  
These findings contradict those from the testing effect literature, which indicate that 
initial testing should enhance memory performance (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006).  In the 
current study I investigated the effects of verbally describing a face on eyewitness 
suggestibility to later misinformation.  Subjects witnessed a simulated crime and then 
either took a test over their memory for the perpetrator of the crime or performed a 
distractor task.  Following a short delay, subjects heard misleading information about the 
perpetrator or only correct information.  All subjects then took a final test over their 
memory for the perpetrator.  Experiment 1 examined memory for the perpetrator using a 
free recall and a cued recall test.  Experiments 2a and 2b examined witness identification 
performance with a target-present and a target-absent lineup, respectively.  Three major 
findings emerged.  First, initial testing increased correct recall probabilities and decreased 
misinformation recall probabilities in Experiment 1.  Second, initial testing increased the 
likelihood of making a correct identification in the target-present lineup.  Third, testing 
reduced identifications of individuals who matched the description of the misinformation 
when subjects were forced to make an identification (i.e., a biased lineup procedure).  
Implications for eyewitness testimony are discussed. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 After witnessing a crime, a person is usually asked to describe the perpetrator or 
to recall details of the event.  A witness can encounter misinformation from a police 
investigator, the news media, or other witnesses prior to or following a description of the 
perpetrator or event.  During later testimony, the witness may recall the misinformation 
instead of the correct event details.  Research on the misinformation effect has revealed 
that memory for events and faces is malleable (Loftus, 1979b; Loftus & Greene, 1980).  
Chan, Thomas, and Bulevich (2009) have recently found that recalling a witnessed event 
can increase people’s susceptibility to misinformation about that event—despite the 
testing effect literature’s indication that testing is a powerful memory enhancer (Spitzer, 
1939).  In the current experiments, I examined how initial testing and misinformation can 
affect memory for a face.  
Eyewitness Suggestibility for Events 
 In a typical misinformation experiment, subjects witness an event (e.g., the car 
stopped at a stop sign prior to an accident) and are later presented with misleading 
information (e.g., the car stopped at a yield sign) in a narrative or through misleading 
questions.  Subjects who have been exposed to misleading information are more likely to 
recall the misinformation than those who had not been exposed to misleading 
information.  Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978) postulated that the misinformation effect 
occurs because the more recent misinformation replaces the original memory.  This 
memory impairment hypothesis has been rigorously debated (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985; Zaragoza, McCloskey, & Jamis, 1987), and it is now clear that the misinformation 
effect is based on a combination of factors.  Memory impairment, misinformation 
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acceptance (i.e., people report the misinformation because the original information was 
never properly encoded or because people accept the misinformation as correct; Belli, 
1989), and retroactive interference may all be responsible for the misinformation effect 
(Loftus & Hoffman, 1989).  The misinformation effect may also be the result of source 
misattributions.  People may have memory for both the original detail and the 
misinformation, but incorrectly attribute the source of the misinformation to the original 
event (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).  
 Although the Loftus paradigm has been influential, it lacks a key component that 
is often present in a real-life situation—namely, an immediate recall test following the 
event.  A witness may talk to a 911 operator or police investigator about the event 
immediately following its occurrence.  Research has shown that taking an initial memory 
test, as opposed to additional studying, can enhance one’s retention of the studied 
material (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006).  Because testing is such a powerful memory 
enhancer, it may inoculate one from later misinformation.  However, experiments 
examining the effects of testing on memory for an event and for a target face have 
yielded mixed results.  
Chan et al. (2009) examined how an initial memory test can affect one’s 
suggestibility to later misinformation.  It was predicted that initial testing would enhance 
memory for the original event, thereby reducing eyewitness suggestibility.  In a series of 
experiments, subjects watched an episode of the Fox television program “24” and were 
given an immediate memory test following the video or they were given a distractor task.  
Following a short delay, subjects listened to an audio narrative that contained some 
misleading information and then took a final memory test.  Surprisingly, Chan et al. 
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found that testing made subjects more susceptible to the misinformation.  It is uncertain 
how this phenomenon, termed retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES), operates, but 
Chan et al. provided several possible explanations.  
Chan et al. (2009) suggested that RES could be the result of an enhancement of 
the learning of the misinformation following retrieval.  For example, Tulving and 
Watkins (1974) found that when subjects learned paired associates (A-B) and were later 
asked to retrieve the target given its cue (A- __), subsequent learning of similar paired 
associates (A-D) was greater relative to subjects who had not been initially tested.  
Applied to an eyewitness situation, initial testing over the original event may increase the 
later learning of related, but misleading, information.  The initial recall test may also 
draw attention to specific parts of the narrative, thus enhancing encoding of the 
misinformation presented in the narrative.  For example, in Chan et al.’s experiments, 
subjects were asked about the vehicle that the main character drove.  Later, subjects heard 
misleading information about this detail (i.e., a pick-up as opposed to an SUV).  When 
subjects were asked about the vehicle in the initial memory test, this question may have 
inadvertently drawn their attention to the misleading detail in the narrative, thereby 
increasing misinformation recall on the final test.  
In addition, the RES effect may be the result of insufficient reconsolidation.  
Recently recalled information may undergo a reconsolidation process, during which the 
memory becomes particularly malleable and vulnerable to interference (see Hardt, 
Einarsson, & Nader, 2010, for a review).  Therefore, if misinformation is presented 
during this reconsolidation process, it may produce greater interference than if one had 
not recalled the event recently.  In two experiments, Chan and Langley (2011) found that 
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RES occurs even when the misinformation is presented long after the completion of the 
reconsolidation period. Thus they concluded that disruption in reconsolidation is not 
necessary for RES to occur, although it may augment the RES effect in some situations 
(e.g., when misinformation is presented soon after the initial test).  The current 
experiments investigated how initial retrieval affects eyewitness suggestibility for faces 
as opposed to events.  Because faces are processed differently than events, RES may or 
may not occur with faces.  
Face Processing verses Event Processing 
Eyewitness memories can encompass memory for a perpetrator’s appearance, 
objects in the environment, and the witnessed event as a whole.  Faces and events are 
thought to be processed quite differently.  A recent review by Kurby and Zacks (2008) 
explored how people perceive and remember events.  People typically parse events into 
smaller segments and actions with distinct boundaries.  This segmentation of events is an 
automatic process that is ultimately beneficial to memory for events.  Rather than 
encoding every small detail of an event, one can encode the event into “chunks” of 
actions and details.  In contrast to parsing an event into smaller segments for encoding, 
faces are considered to be processes as a single object, which is often referred to as 
holistic processing.  
Tanaka and Farah (1993) postulated that faces are recognized holistically.  They 
define a holistic representation as one without an internal part structure.  In other words, 
faces are recognized based on the whole face rather than individual features or 
component parts such as eyes, nose, and mouth.  In a series of three experiments, Tanaka 
and Farah asked subjects to memorize several whole and scrambled faces.  Immediately 
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following this study phase, subjects were given a recognition test that measured accuracy 
for features presented in whole faces and in isolation.  Subjects were better at identifying 
features from normal, whole, faces than at identifying facial features presented in 
isolation.  Tanaka and Farah used inverted faces in addition to upright faces as the stimuli 
in Experiment 2.  Once again, there was a benefit of presenting the feature in the context 
of the entire face, but this benefit was found only for upright faces.  In the third and final 
experiment, researchers examined whether a holistic representation was specific to faces 
or if the same was true of other objects, such as houses.  Results indicated that the 
benefits of holistic processing were in fact specific to faces.  
Note that Tanaka and Farah’s (1993) holistic theory is not the only account of 
face processing.  Mauer, Le Grand, and Mondloch (2002) argue that face recognition 
depends on three types of configural processing: first-order relations (i.e., a face typically 
consists of two eyes above a nose above a mouth), second-order relations (the spacing 
among facial features), and holistic processing.  Regardless of how exactly faces are 
processed and remembered, it appears safe to suggest that vast differences exist between 
event and face processing and it is possible that each is affected by testing and 
misinformation differently.  I now review studies that have examined suggestibility for 
faces; I then review the effects of verbal descriptions on later perpetrator identifications.  
Eyewitness Suggestibility for People 
Although memory for faces and events are thought to involve different processes, 
several researchers have found both to be susceptible to suggestion and interference.  For 
example, Christiaansen, Sweeney, and Ochalek (1983) showed that after witnessing an 
event, subjects’ estimates of a suspect’s weight varied widely depending on whether the 
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suspect was described as a dancer or a truck driver.  In addition, several researchers (e.g., 
Loftus & Greene, 1980; Searcy, Bartlett, & Memon, 2000) have examined the effects of 
misleading postevent information on memory for faces.  In an experiment described by 
Loftus and Greene (1980), subjects watched a video of a simulated crime. Following a 20 
min delay, subjects read a description of the suspect supposedly written by a professor.  
This description included either all correct information or some misinformation (e.g., that 
the perpetrator had a moustache when in fact he did not).  All subjects then wrote out a 
description of the perpetrator.  Those who heard the misinformation were more likely to 
include the misleading detail in their description than those who did not hear any 
misleading information.   
In a second experiment, Loftus and Greene (1980) examined whether 
misinformation could also affect an eyewitness’ ability to select a target in a 12-person, 
simultaneous, target-absent lineup.  Subjects who heard that the suspect had a moustache, 
when in fact he did not, were significantly more likely to choose a person with a 
moustache than those who did not hear the misinformation.  Searcy, Bartlett, and Memon 
(2000) also found that encountering a misleading detail about a target face led to an 
increase in choosing a photo that included the incorrect detail.  These experiments 
indicate that memory for a person, like events, is malleable.   
Witness Descriptions of the Perpetrator 
 Eyewitness descriptions of a perpetrator can be a crucial part in apprehending a 
suspect.  The most common technique in questioning witnesses about a suspect is free 
recall followed by probing questions (i.e., cued recall) to fill in any missing information.  
This technique, however, can lead to false recall (Meissner, Sporer, & Schooler, 2007).  
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Police investigators may press witnesses to generate descriptions of an event or 
perpetrator (similar to forced recall), which can cause witnesses to generate highly 
confident false memories (Lane & Zaragoza, 2009).  Critically, confidently held 
memories are typically judged accurate by jurors even when they are incorrect (Wells, 
Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979).  
Eyewitness descriptions of a perpetrator are invaluable in apprehending a suspect; 
but are they accurate and to what extent?  Van Koppen and Lochen (1997) compiled 
2,299 witness descriptions and found that people were able to give accurate, though very 
general, descriptions of a target.  Their descriptions typically included information such 
as gender, age, height, build, race, and hair color, but little information was offered for 
facial characteristics.  When witnesses did describe facial features, they typically only 
elaborated on the upper half of the face, such as the eyes and hair.   
For cases with no clear suspects, face composites are used to help identify the 
perpetrator.  Tools such as Photofit, Identikit, Mac-a-Mug, and the FACES program have 
been developed whereby witnesses can compile a face from a database of component 
features (i.e., eyes, lips, noses, hair, etc.; Davies & Valentine, 2007).  However, these 
face composites tend to bare little likeness to the person they attempt to model (Christie 
& Ellis, 1981; Wells & Hasel, 2007).  Wells, Charman, and Olson (2005) investigated 
how building these face composites can affect later identification in a lineup.  They found 
that building a face composite reduced the probability of correctly identifying the 
perpetrator in the lineup.  Wells and Hasel (2007) suggested that the detrimental effects 
of building a face composite can be attributed to a mismatch in processing strategies 
between face encoding and composite building.  Specifically, composite building is done 
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at a featural level whereas faces are typically encoded and recognized in a holistic 
manner. 
Information provided by co-witnesses can also affect eyewitness memory (Leippe 
& Eisenstadt, 2007; Luus & Wells, 1994).  When witnesses view an inaccurate face-
composite purportedly built by another witness that includes a misleading detail, 
witnesses are more likely to identify a suspect with that misleading detail (Jenkins & 
Davies, 1985).  In sum, building and viewing face composites can be detrimental to one’s 
later face recognition accuracy.  In fact, Christie and Ellis (1981) found that verbal 
descriptions actually provide more useful information about a person than face 
composites.  However, verbally describing a face can also alter one’s memory for a 
perpetrator.  
Verbal Overshadowing and Facilitation 
Research has indicated that verbally recalling specific features of a face can 
hinder the subsequent accurate recognition of a face.  In their seminal study, Schooler and 
Engstler-Schooler (1990) termed this phenomenon verbal overshadowing.  In one 
experiment, subjects watched a video of a bank robbery and either provided a description 
of the perpetrator from memory (i.e., a memory test) or participated in an additional 
distractor task.  Subjects in the test condition were given 5 min to write out a detailed 
description of the robber’s face and were encouraged to describe each facial feature in 
detail.  All subjects were then shown an eight-person, simultaneous, target-present lineup 
with the option of selecting no photo.  Schooler and Engstler-Schooler found that 
recalling features of a face reduced the likelihood of correct identifications in the lineup 
task.   
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In a recent review, Chin and Schooler (2008) identified three potential 
explanations for verbal overshadowing: self-generated misinformation (Meissner, 
Brigham, & Kelley, 2001), a criterion shift (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004), and recoding 
interference (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).  Verbal overshadowing may occur 
because of self-generated misinformation.  When asked to elaborate on a person’s face, 
one may recall inaccurate details thus resulting in lower accuracy on a subsequent lineup 
(Meissner et al., 2001).  Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) postulated that verbal 
overshadowing could be the result of a criterion shift (i.e., an increased reluctance to 
choose a target), because the verbal overshadowing effect disappeared when subjects 
were forced to choose a target from a target-present lineup.   
Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) postulated that verbal overshadowing may 
be due to recoding interference whereby verbalizing a visual memory results in an 
incorrect representation of the target face in memory.  No interference occurs when 
people are asked to visualize a visual memory or verbalize a verbal memory.  It is only 
when the memory and test have an incongruent processing requirement that 
overshadowing occurs.  When people verbally describe a face, they break down the face 
into component parts—such as eyes, nose, and mouth—eliciting a focal or featural 
processing strategy.  This featural processing differs from the way faces are normally 
processed (i.e., holistically) and such a mismatch in face processing may harm face 
recognition accuracy.   
Macrae and Lewis (2002) showed that priming different types of processing (i.e., 
global or local) can affect identification accuracy in a lineup.  In their experiment, 
subjects watched a simulated crime video and engaged in a distractor activity (control 
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group) or a letter identification task.  In the letter identification task, subjects either 
reported the global or local identity in a series of Navon letters, which are pictures of 
letters made up of smaller letters (see Figure 1).  If subjects were asked to report the 
global identity, they were to report the larger letter made up of the smaller letters, which 
is thought to prime holistic 
processing.  If subjects were 
asked to report the local 
identity, they were to report 
the smaller letters that make 
up the large letter.  This task 
is designed to prime featural 
processing.  Subjects in the 
featural processing 
condition were less likely to 
identify the perpetrator and those in the holistic processing condition were more likely to 
identify the perpetrator compared to controls—indicating a benefit of holistic processing.   
Recalling a person’s face does not always harm later identification performance.  
In a meta-analysis, Meissner and Brigham (2001) found that the verbal overshadowing 
effect is small but reliable (d = .12 over 29 studies).  Moreover, the effect appears to be 
quite specific.  When people are asked to elaborate on a face, they are more likely to 
show verbal overshadowing.  Further, a short delay (under 30 min) between the initial 
test and the lineup typically results in verbal overshadowing, but delays longer that 30 
min typically result in verbal facilitation (i.e., initial testing increases the likelihood of 
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correctly selecting the perpetrator; see Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990, Experiment 
5, for an exception).  Short delays, however, are unlikely in real-life eyewitness 
situations.  It is unrealistic for a person to witness an event, verbally describe the person, 
and see a lineup immediately afterward.  In fact, show-ups (i.e., when the suspect is 
caught soon after the crime, the witness may be brought to the scene of the arrest to 
identify the perpetrator) are used more often in these situations (Dysart & Lindsay, 2007). 
Since Meissner and Brigham’s (2001) review of verbal overshadowing, several 
studies have found facilitatory effects of verbalization on later correct identifications.  In 
a study conducted by Meissner et al. (2001), subjects viewed a target face for 10 s and 
were randomly assigned to one of four testing conditions following a 5 min distractor 
activity: forced recall, standard recall, warning recall, and control (no recall).  Subjects in 
the standard recall instructions mirrored those of previous verbal overshadowing 
experiments.  Subjects then saw a lineup either immediately or following a 30 min delay.  
There was verbal overshadowing in the standard condition with no delay.  However, 
when the delay was increased to 30 min, there was a verbal facilitation effect.  
Specifically, subjects who verbally described the perpetrator chose the target more often 
(.57) than the control subjects (.37).  Warning subjects that they should only describe 
features for which they are certain also resulted in significantly higher hit rates than 
controls.  However, forcing subjects to generate elaborate descriptions of a target (forced 
recall) significantly decreased accuracy regardless of delay.   
More recent investigations into verbal facilitation have uncovered some of the 
specific circumstances in which facilitatory effects are found.  In a series of experiments 
conducted by Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2005), subjects studied multiple faces and, after 
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each face, described the face for 15 s or completed a distractor activity.  An old/new 
recognition task immediately followed this study/recall phase.  Brown and Lloyd-Jones 
found verbal facilitation with standard recall instructions, when subjects were asked to 
describe similarities and differences between faces, and when asked to provide both 
holistic and featural descriptors during the initial recall phase.  Brown, Gehrke, and 
Lloyd-Jones (2010) also utilized this same procedure with standard recall instructions and 
found the verbal facilitation effect was greater for upright and unfamiliar faces than for 
inverted or familiar faces.  In a recent review, Meissner, Sporer, and Susa (2008) 
explained that several factors, in addition to those described in Meissner and Brigham 
(2001), might contribute to verbal overshadowing and facilitation.  First, verbal 
facilitation is more likely to occur when there are multiple targets whereas verbal 
overshadowing is more likely with a single target.  Second, the extent to which subjects 
are provided with the opportunity to generate a verbal description can affect later correct 
identifications.  For example, when descriptions are brief and precise, verbal facilitation 
is typically seen.  
There are conflicting findings about whether verbal overshadowing occurs in a 
target-absent lineup.  Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) and Memon and Rose (2001) 
found verbal facilitation with a target-absent lineup with no delay between verbalization 
and the lineup.  However, Yu and Geiselman (1993) and Meissner (2002; Experiment 1) 
found verbal overshadowing with a target-absent lineup.  Yu and Geiselman had a 48 
hour delay and Meissner included a 5 min delay between verbalization and lineup 
identification.  Recently, Sauerland, Holub, and Sporer (2008) examined choosing rates 
in a target-absent lineup following a 1 week delay between the description and the lineup.  
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They found no difference in correct rejections between the no description and description 
only conditions.  It was only when subjects re-read their earlier descriptions that verbal 
interference occurred.  Because of the mixed findings, the current study included both a 
target-present and target-absent lineup.   
The Current Study 
 The current study examined whether verbally recalling a face immediately 
following the witnessed event enhances or reduces later eyewitness suggestibility for 
faces.  Chan et al. (2009) found that initial retrieval can enhance suggestibility for events, 
but it is unknown whether this effect will generalize to faces.  Faces are processed 
holistically whereas an event is processed sequentially as it unfolds over time.  Therefore, 
the effects of testing on susceptibility to misinformation may be quite different for faces 
relative to events.  Because witnesses are often questioned soon after a crime, it is 
important to understand how this initial test can affect one’s later memory for the 
perpetrator—especially in the face of misleading information. 
The overall design of the first experiment was similar to Experiment 1 of Loftus 
and Greene (1980) except that an initial test condition was included.  In the first 
experiment, subjects watched a simulated crime and then described the perpetrator’s face 
(initial test condition) or performed a distractor task (no initial test condition).  Following 
a 20 min delay, subjects listened to a narrative describing the perpetrator. The narrative 
included either an erroneous detail (misleading condition) or only correct information 
(control condition).  After an additional 10 min delay, all subjects then provided a verbal 
description of the suspect (i.e., a final recall test).  In Experiments 2a and 2b, the final 
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recall test was replaced by a simultaneous, six-person, target-present and target-absent 
lineup, respectively. 
It was hypothesized that initial testing would result in greater misinformation 
recall on the final test.  Such a pattern can be considered consistent with the transfer-
appropriate processing framework (Fisher & Craik, 1977; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 
1977).  Specifically, the initial recall test forces subjects to break down the target’s face 
into featural components and the narrative provided later is a featural description of the 
target.  Thus, the initial test may better integrate the misinformation with the original 
memory.  Alternatively, initial testing may reduce susceptibility to misinformation.  
Testing protects against forgetting, and it, therefore, may make subjects more resistant to 
misinformation.  Witnesses are typically less suggestible to misinformation when the 
event has been encoded particularly well (Loftus, 1979a; Marche, 1999).  Moreover, the 
current study included a 30 min delay between the verbal description and the lineup 
identification task, thus increasing the likelihood of verbal facilitation, such that the 
verbal description may protect the memory of the face from misinformation.  
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Chapter 2. Experiment 1  
Method 
Subjects and design.  One hundred thirty-eight students at Iowa State University 
participated in this experiment for partial course credit.  Ten subjects were excluded from 
analyses because English was not their primary language.  Therefore, all analyses were 
based on the remaining 128 subjects (66 female, 62 male).  The experiment used a 2 (test 
type: initial test vs. no initial test) X 3 (postevent information: control, facial hair, mole) 
between-subjects design.  Sixty-four subjects heard the control narrative, 32 heard the 
facial hair detail, and 32 heard the mole detail.  
Materials and procedure.  The study was run on individual computer terminals 
separated by dividers.  Up to eight subjects participated simultaneously.  Subjects viewed 
two foil videos and then a simulated crime video.  They were told that the video clips 
may be used in future studies and that the videos were being pilot tested to ensure that 
people are able to see and hear everything in the videos adequately.  Subjects were 
further told that following the videos they would rate each clip on its video and sound 
quality.  These instructions were designed to encourage incidental encoding of the critical 
event.  The first two videos were 60 s long and featured neutral material with no people.  
The first video showed a Hawaiian beach and the second video showed a rabbit 
performing tricks.  
The critical event video was approximately 45 s in length.  This video showed a 
male student studying in a room (purportedly in the library) about 15 feet from the 
camera.  The student answers a phone call and leaves the room.  A man then approaches 
the desk, searches through the student’s backpack for a wallet, takes the wallet and a 
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laptop computer, and quickly leaves.  The perpetrator is a white male in his early 20s 
with short, brown hair and no other distinguishing characteristics.  He is in full view for 
15 s of the video.  Afterwards, subjects completed an audio/visual rating task.  In this 
task, subjects rated each video clip on its video and audio quality on a scale of 1 (very 
poor) to 7 (excellent).  This rating task was followed by a demographic questionnaire (see 
Appendix A).  
Subjects then either took the initial tests or played Tetris for 10 min as a distractor 
activity.  Subjects in the initial test condition were first given 5 min to type out a 
description of the target.  They were asked to be as detailed as possible in their 
description (see Appendix B for instructions given).  Following this free recall test, 
subjects were administered a cued recall test, which included 12 questions that asked for 
descriptions of specific features of the target (see Appendix C for the list of questions).  
The questions ranged from more general details, such as clothing and build, to more 
detailed questions about the man’s face.  Subjects were given 25 s to answer each 
question.   
Following the initial test/distractor phase, all subjects completed the computerized 
Operation Span (OSPAN) task, a test of working memory capacity (WMC; Unsworth, 
Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).  In the OSPAN task, subjects memorized letter strings 
while solving simple math problems.  The OSPAN was included to prevent rehearsal of 
the target event and to introduce a retention interval.  Because each person completes this 
task at different times, the experimenter moved on to the next phase of the experiment 
only after all subjects tested during the same session were finished.  This was the case for 
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all span tasks used in the current experiment.  Most subjects completed this task within 
20 min.  No subject took more than 30 min for this task.  
After subjects completed the OSPAN task, they listened to an audio narrative that 
included one piece of misinformation or no misinformation (control narrative).  There 
were two different misinformation narratives—one mentioned that the perpetrator had 
facial hair on his chin; the other indicated that he had a mole on his left cheek (see 
Appendix D for narrative scripts).  Whether a subject heard the control narrative or one of 
the misleading narratives was counterbalanced across subjects.  Similar to Loftus and 
Greene (1980), subjects were told that a professor wrote out a description of the 
perpetrator immediately after watching the same video and that a research assistant read 
and recorded the description in the audio narrative.  They were asked to listen to the 
narrative carefully, but were not given any further instructions.  
Next, subjects completed the computerized Symmetry Span (SSPAN) task 
(Unsworth et al., 2005).  In this task, subjects were to remember spatial locations while 
determining whether block shapes were symmetrical.  This distractor phase lasted 
approximately 10 minutes.  Afterwards, subjects took part in the final test phase, which 
included the same free recall and cued recall test as the initial test phase.  Subjects were 
then asked, retrospectively, if they encoded the crime video intentionally (across 
Experiments 1 and 2, 25% of subjects reported that they had intentionally encoded the 
critical event video).  Further, they were asked whether they noticed any incorrect 
information in the narrative (11% reported that they had noticed incorrect information in 
the postevent narrative).  
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In order to collect additional WMC data, subjects completed the computerized 
Reading Span (RSPAN) task (Unsworth et al., 2005).  In the RSPAN task, subjects 
memorized letter strings while deciding whether sentences made sense.  Scores on the 
three SPAN tasks were combined to produce a single estimate for subjects’ WMC.  
Several researchers (Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002; Roediger & Geraci, 2007) have found 
executive functioning (as estimated by a battery of neuropsychological tests from Glisky, 
Polster, and Routhieaux, 1995) to be negatively correlated with misinformation recall for 
an eyewitness event.  However, it is unknown whether individual differences in WMC 
will affect susceptibility to misinformation about faces. 
Results and Discussion 
Responses were classified as either Correct or Misinformation.  The free recall 
test was coded using the first 11 questions on the cued recall test as the criteria for correct 
recall.  For example, if a subject reports the man’s shirt color and hair color correctly, but 
gives no other details, then that subject would have a free recall accuracy probability of 
.18 (2 out of 11 correct).  Correct recall probabilities did not include question 8 (the 
question about the misinformation) in the final test.  One researcher coded half of the free 
recall and half of the cued recall tests; a second researcher coded the other half.  In 
addition, they each coded a subset of each other’s already coded data.  Their inter-rater 
reliability was high, r(126) = .95, p < .01.   
Logistic regression analyses were used to examine interaction effects for binary 
data.  Pearson’s chi-square tests were used to examine simple and main effects for binary 
data.  Partial eta squared (ηp2) indicates effect size for analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
Cohen’s d indicates effect size for t-tests.  Phi (φ) indicates effect size for chi-square 
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tests.  Working memory capacity (as measured by a principal component analysis1) was 
not related to any dependent measures of eyewitness memory in all experiments and 
therefore will not be mentioned further. 
Initial Tests.  See Table 1 for results from the initial test.  Spontaneous reporting of the 
misinformation was rare in both free recall (M = .06) and in cued recall (M = .09).  When 
a person recalled the misinformation in the initial test, it was always about the facial hair 
detail. 
              
Final Test.  Separate analyses were conducted for free and cued recall tests.  See Table 2 
for correct recall probabilities.  A 2 (test type: no test, test) X 3 (postevent information: 
control, mole, facial hair) ANOVA revealed no significant interaction for correct recall in 
either the free or cued recall tests, Fs < 1.  There was, however, a significant testing 
effect in both the free recall test, F(1, 122) = 13.79, p < .01, ηp2 = .10, and the cued recall 
test, F(1, 122) = 7.13, p < .01, ηp2 = .06.  Subjects who took an initial test had a greater 
correct recall probability (M = .51 in free recall and M = .76 in cued recall) on the final 
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tests than those who did not take an initial test (M = .40 and M = .67).  Note, however, 
that the testing effect in the free recall test is not a pure testing effect.  The free recall 
tests were scored based on the cued recall questions and the tested subjects had been 
exposed to these questions prior to the final test.  Therefore, tested subjects were at an 
advantage as they could use the initial cued recall questions could guide their subsequent 
free recall attempt.  
 
Table 2   
Mean probabilities of correct recall on the final cued and free recall tests as a function of 
postevent information condition in Experiment 1 
Free Recall Test          Cued Recall Test 
   No Initial Test       Initial Test         No Initial Test       Initial Test 
 
Control        (N = 64)    .40 (.15)        .55 (.20)  .70 (.19)     .75 (.16)      
Facial Hair  (N = 32)    .39 (.13)        .47 (.16)  .66 (.12)     .71 (.20) 
Mole            (N = 32)    .40 (.16)        .51 (.10)  .66 (.11)     .81 (.14)  
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
  
Although the testing effect in the free and cued recall tests is not surprising, some 
previous studies (e.g., Chan and Langley, 2011; Chan et al., 2009) found no such testing 
effect with a 30 min delay between retrieval and the final memory test.  This suggests 
that the information in the critical event video was susceptible to rapid forgetting—likely 
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due to the short length of the critical event video and the instructions given to promote 
incidental encoding of the video.   
See Table 3 for the percentage of subjects reporting the misinformation on the 
final test.  A 2 (test type) X 3 (postevent information) logistic regression analysis 
revealed a significant interaction for the free recall test, χ²(2, N = 128) = 17.58, p < .01, 
and the cued recall test, χ²(2, N = 128) = 19.46, p < .01.  Specifically, testing reduced 
misinformation recall in the facial hair narrative condition, but not in the control or mole 
narrative condition.  There was a significant misinformation effect in both free and cued 
recall.  In the free recall test, subjects were far more likely to report the misinformation if 
they had heard the facial hair detail (53%; χ²(1, N = 96) = 33.60, p < .01, φ = .59) or the 
mole detail (63%; χ²(1, N = 96) = 42.58, p < .01, φ = .67) than those who heard the 
control narrative (3%).  The cued recall data mirrored those from the free recall test; 
subjects were more likely to report the misinformation if they had heard the facial hair 
detail (63%; χ²(1, N = 96) = 28.06, p < .01, φ = .54) and the mole detail (69%; χ²(1, N = 
96) = 33.82, p < .01, φ = .59) than if they had not (11%).   
Most relevant for current purposes is the finding that initial testing reduced 
misinformation recall. Specifically, initial testing reduced the likelihood of subjects 
reporting the facial hair detail in the cued recall test, χ²(1, N = 32) = 4.80, p = .03, φ = 
.39.  The data for subjects who heard the mole detail were less clear.  To increase power, 
the data for the facial hair group and the mole group were collapsed, which revealed a 
significant testing effect such that initial testing reduced misinformation recall on the 
final cued recall test from 78% to 53%, χ²(1, N = 64) = 4.43, p = .04, φ = .26.  However, 
no difference was found in the free recall test, χ² < 1, p = .80.   
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Table 3  
Percentage of subjects reporting the misinformation in the final test in Experiment 1   
 
    Free Recall Test      Cued Recall Test 
   No Initial Test     Initial Test       No Initial Test       Initial Test 
 
Control         (N = 64)          3             3  16         6      
Facial Hair   (N = 32)        56           50  81       44 
Mole          (N = 32)        56           69  73       63 
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Chapter 3. Experiment 2 
In addition to providing person descriptions to help identify a suspect, witness 
memory of a perpetrator is often tested in a lineup identification task.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand how the results from Experiment1 translate to a situation in 
which a witness must identify a perpetrator in a lineup.  A target-present lineup and 
target-absent lineup were used as the final test in Experiments 2a and 2b, respectively.  
To facilitate comparisons between the two lineups, Experiments 2a and 2b were 
conducted simultaneously. 
Experiment 2a: Target-Present Lineup 
Method 
Subjects and Design.  Two hundred fifty-seven students at Iowa State University 
participated in this experiment for partial course credit.  A total of 17 subjects were 
excluded from analyses: thirteen because English was not their primary language, two did 
not follow instructions, and two because of a computer error.  Therefore, all analyses 
were based on the remaining 240 subjects (122 females, 112 males, 6 chose not to 
answer).  The experiment used a 2 (test type: initial test vs. no initial test) X 2 (postevent 
information: control vs. misinformation) between-subjects design.  There were 60 
subjects in each condition. 
Materials and Procedure.  The materials and procedure for Experiment 2a were 
identical to those of Experiment 1 except the misinformation narrative that included the 
mole detail was not used.  Instead, only the control narrative and the misleading narrative 
that included the facial hair detail (referred to as the misleading narrative from now on) 
were used because pilot testing indicated that subjects ignored the mole detail in the 
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lineup photos. This may have occurred because the mole detail was too small to be 
clearly visible on a face, but including a mole that is large enough might look unnatural.    
The most significant change in Experiment 2a was the inclusion of the target-
present lineup identification task (instead of a recall test).  Subjects saw a six-person, 
simultaneous, target-present lineup (see Appendix E for sample lineup and instructions).  
Photos included in the lineup were obtained from a database of photos from students at 
Iowa State University.  The six foil photos used in the lineup were chosen based on 
extensive pilot testing to ensure similar choosing rates across the photos (range: 5% to 
24% on a forced-choice lineup).  All foils and the target had no facial hair; however, each 
foil photo was altered using Photoshop so that there was a “clean-faced” version of the 
foil and a version in which the foil had facial hair on the chin (see Appendix F for altered 
and unaltered foil photos).  In addition, all photos were altered to include a white collar.  
Five of the six foils were randomly chosen for each target-present lineup (all six were 
used in the target-absent lineup in Experiment 2b), such that each lineup contained three 
photos that matched the description of the control narrative (one target photo and two 
control foils) and three photos that matched the description of the misleading narrative 
(misleading foil).  Whether a foil was consistent with the control narrative or had facial 
hair was randomized.  If a subject chose a foil with facial hair, it was scored as a 
misinformation identification.  
Subjects were asked to look at each photo carefully and to identify the perpetrator 
by pressing the number that appeared underneath his photo (1-6).  They were also given 
the option of selecting no photo by pressing “N”, which indicated that the target was not 
present in the lineup.  The experimenter emphasized that the person in the video may or 
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may not be in the photo lineup.  Subjects who indicated that the target was not in the 
lineup were shown the same lineup immediately afterwards and were asked to choose the 
person that looked most like the target from the video.  With this procedure, it is possible 
to examine whether non-choosers would select a misleading foil in a forced-choice, 
biased lineup procedure2.   
Following the lineup, subjects were asked a series of questions obtained from 
Wells and Bradfield (1998; see Appendix G).  This task was self paced.  Afterwards, the 
final screen displayed all six unaltered foil photos and the target.  Subjects were asked if 
they recognize any of the people on the screen from outside of the experiment (e.g., a 
friend, classmate, etc.) and to type in the corresponding number of the people they 
recognize.  No subject recognized any person from the lineup.  
Results and Discussion 
Responses for the initial free and cued recall tests were classified as either Correct 
or Misinformation.  Because inter-rater reliability in Experiment 1 was high, only one 
researcher coded the responses in the free and cued recall tests in Experiment 2.  Lineup 
identification was coded as either Correct Identification, Misleading Foil Identification, 
Control Foil Identification (i.e., identification of a nontarget without facial hair), or No 
Identification. 
Initial Test.  See Table 4 for results from the initial test in Experiments 2a and 2b.  
Baserate false recall probability was low in the free recall and cued recall tests (M = .03 
for both). 
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Table 4 
 
Mean probabilities of correct and misinformation recall in the initial test phase in 
Experiment 2           
Free Recall  Cued Recall    
Experiment 2a  Correct    .27 (.12)    .55 (.15)  
Misinformation   .03 (.18)    .03 (.16) 
Experiment 2b  Correct    .28 (.14)    .57 (.13) 
Misinformation    .06 (.24)    .03 (.17) 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Lineup Identification.  Lineup identification data are presented in Table 5.  For correct 
identifications, a 2 (test type) X 2 (postevent information) logistic regression analysis 
revealed no significant interaction, χ² < 1, p = .56.  There was, however, a significant 
main effect of postevent information, χ²(1, N = 240) = 5.66, p = .02, φ = .15, such that 
misinformation reduced correct identifications from 23% to 12%.  Consistent with 
previous research that used at least a 30 min delay between initial testing and lineup 
identification (Meissner et al., 2001), there was a significant testing effect, χ²(1, N = 240) 
= 5.66, p = .02, φ = .15.  Specifically, subjects who took an initial test were more likely to 
select the target (23%) than those who were not initially tested (12%)—a verbal 
facilitation effect.  What is new about the current study is that initial testing appeared to 
enhance correct identifications even after subjects encountered misinformation.  
However, planned comparisons revealed that testing significantly increased correct 
identification when there was no misinformation, χ²(1, N = 120) = 4.66, p = .03, φ = .20, 
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but this testing effect was diminished after subjects heard the misinformation, χ²(1, N = 
120) = 1.29, p = .26, φ = .10.  
 
Table 5  
Percentage of subjects identifying the target, a misleading foil, a control foil, and making 
no identification in Experiment 2a 
               
Postevent       Initial Test   Identification    Identification       Identification          No                     
Information   Condition       of target      of misinformation    of control foil  Identification  
 
Control          No Initial Test  15      27        27           32 
                      Initial Test  32      28        10           32 
 
Misleading    No Initial Test    8      42          8                      42  
                      Initial Test  15      43        10                      32  
 
 
For misinformation identifications, there was no significant interaction between 
initial testing and postevent information, χ² < 1, p = .98.  There was, however, a 
significant misinformation effect, χ²(1, N = 240) = 5.93, p = .01, φ = .16.  Misinformation 
increased the likelihood of selecting a misleading foil from 28% to 43%.  There was no 
significant effect of initial testing on misinformation choosing.  Therefore, testing 
increased correct identifications without reducing the misinformation effect. 
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For control foil identification, there was a significant interaction between initial 
testing and postevent information, χ²(1, N = 240) = 10.39, p < .01.  Testing reduced 
control foil identifications in the control condition, but not in the misleading condition.  
There was also a marginally significant main effect of initial testing; subjects who took 
an initial test were less likely to choose a control foil (10%) than those who did not take 
an initial test (18%), χ²(1, N = 240) = 2.85, p = .09, φ = .11.  Further, there was a 
significant main effect of postevent information; subjects who heard the control narrative 
were more likely to choose a control foil (18%) than those who heard the misinformation 
(9%), χ²(1, N = 240) = 4.25, p = .04, φ = .13.   
Dunning and Perretta 
(2002) reported that subjects 
are more likely to make a 
correct identification if they 
responded within 10 to 12 
seconds on a lineup 
identification task.  Weber, 
Brewer, Wells, Semmler, and 
Keast (2004), however, 
found that the 10 to 12 
second rule does not always 
apply.  I examined the effects 
of response time (RT) on 
choosing rates in a time-boundary analysis (Figure 2).  The time boundary analysis 
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mirrored that utilized by Dunning and Perretta and Weber et al.  Accuracy was compared 
for subjects above and below a time boundary (faster or equal vs. slower) in a series of 
chi-square tests with the boundary set at 1 s time intervals from 6 s to 30 s (i.e., 6 s, 7 s, 8 
s, and so on).  All subjects were included in the analysis (including nonchoosers).  The 
peak in the series of chi-squares indicates the time boundary discriminating between 
correct and incorrect subjects and between misinformation choosers and non 
misinformation choosers for the top and bottom figures respectively.  For target 
identifications, subjects who responded in 9 sec or less were more accurate (33%; N = 
24) than those with longer response latencies (18%; N = 216), χ²(1, N = 240) 4.63, p = 
.03, φ = .14.  In contrast, for misinformation idenitifications, subjects who responded 
within 22 sec were less likely to choose a misleading foil (27%; N = 142) than their 
slower counterparts (47%; N = 98), χ²(1, N = 240) = 10.38, p < .01, φ = .21.     
Subjects who made no identification were shown the same lineup a second time 
and forced to select a photo that most resembles the man from the video (see Table 6 for 
choosing rates).  A 2 (test type) X 2 (postevent information) logistic regression analysis 
revealed no significant interaction for correct identifications, χ² < 1, p = .52, but there was 
a marginally significant testing effect (30% target identifications for tested subjects and 
14% for nontested), χ²(1, N = 81) = 3.14, p = .08, φ = .20.  There was also a marginally 
significant main effect of postevent information, χ²(1, N = 81) = 3.14, p = .08, φ = .20, 
such that  misinformation reduced correct identifications (30% for controls and 14% for 
misled subjects).   
For misinformation identifications, there was no significant interaction between 
initial testing and postevent information, χ²(1, N = 81) = 1.19, p = .28.  Subjects who took 
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an initial test were less likely to choose a misleading foil (41%) than those who were not 
tested initially (64%), χ²(1, N = 240) = 4.31, p = .04, φ = .23.  Moreover, those who 
listened to the misleading narrative were more likely (66%) to choose a misleading foil 
than control subjects (39%), χ²(1, N = 240) = 6.63, p = .01, φ = .28.   
 
Table 6 
 Percentage of subjects identifying the target, a misleading foil, and a control foil under 
forced identification in Experiment 2a 
     
Postevent       Initial Test             Identification     Identification         Identification 
Information   Condition                     of target        of misinformation   of control foil            
 
Control          No Initial Test (N = 19)        26   42         32 
                      Initial Test       (N = 25)        33   33         33 
 
Misleading    No Initial Test (N = 18)         4    80         16 
                      Initial Test       (N = 19)        26   47         26 
 
 
Although witnesses are never forced to make an identification in real-life, they 
may feel pressured to make an identification in a biased lineup procedure.  To examine 
the effects of initial testing and misinformation in a biased lineup, I examined the 
combined identification rates of the initial lineup and the forced-choice lineup (see Table 
7).  There was no significant interaction between initial testing and postevent information 
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for correct identifications, χ² < 1, p = .60. There was, however, a significant testing effect,  
χ²(1, N = 240) = 9.09, p < .01, φ = .20. That is, testing increased correct identifications 
from 17% to 33%.  There was also a significant main effect of postevent information, 
χ²(1, N = 240) = 7.37, p < .01, φ = .18, such that the control group was more likely to 
select the target (33%) than the mislead group (17%).   
 
Table 7 
 Percentage of subjects identifying the target, a misleading foil, and a control foil when 
the identification rates from the regular and forced-choice lineups were combined in 
Experiment 2a 
     
Postevent Initial Test          Identification   Identification            Identification 
Information Condition               of target            of misinformation        of control foil            
 
Control No Initial Test        23          40         37 
Initial Test        42          38         20 
Misleading No Initial Test         10          75         15 
Initial Test        23          58         18 
 
For total misinformation identifications, there was a significant interaction 
between initial testing and postevent information, χ²(1, N = 240) = 5.26, p = .02.  
Specifically, the size of the misinformation effect was reduced by nearly half (from 35% 
to 20%) if subjects had been tested.  There was also a significant misinformation effect, 
χ²(1, N = 240) = 18.21, p < .01, φ= .28.  Subjects in the misleading group chose a 
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misleading foil at a higher rate (67%) than controls (39%).  For subjects who heard the 
misleading narrative, there was a significant testing benefit, χ²(1, N = 240) = 3.76, p =  
.05, φ = .18; initial testing reduced misinformation identifications, thus replicating the 
findings in Experiment 1 but in a lineup identification task.   
Follow-up Questions.  Following the lineup identification task, subjects were asked 
several follow-up questions.  See Table 8 for results.  These data were collected for 
exploratory purposes only.  Compared to nontested subjects, the tested subjects rated 
themselves as paying less attention to the perpetrator’s face, t(238) = 2.89, p < .01, d = 
.37, and less able to pick out details from his face in the video (marginally significant; 
t(238) = 1.80, p = .07, d = .23).  However, initial testing enhanced subjects’ ability to 
estimate the length of time that the target’s face was visible, t(238) = 1.97, p = .05, d = 
.26.  Specifically, subjects who took an initial test more closely approximated the length 
of time the target’s face was visible (M = 12.99) than those who did not take an initial test 
(M = 10.44); the target’s face had been in view for 15 sec.  
 Subjects who correctly identified the target reported greater confidence (68%) and 
had a greater willingness to testify (42%) than those who were incorrect (46% and 28%), 
t(234) = 3.78, p < .01, d = .65, and  t(234) = 2.80, p < .01, d = .45, respectively.  
Compared to incorrect subjects, the correct subjects more closely approximated the 
length of time the target’s face was in view, rated themselves as having a better view of 
the target, found the lineup task easier, and estimated that they spent less time on the 
lineup, ts > 2.68, ps < .01, ds > .42. Compared to subjects who did not choose the 
misinformation, misinformation choosers rated themselves as paying less attention to the  
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target’s face,  t(238) = 2.02, p = .04, d = .13, and were poorer at estimating the length of 
time the target’s face was in view, t(238) = 2.32, p = .02, d = .35. 
Experiment 2b: Target-Absent Lineup 
Method 
Subjects and Design.  Two hundred and twelve students at Iowa State University 
participated in this experiment for partial course credit.  A total of 12 subjects were 
excluded from analyses: ten because English was not their primary language, one did not 
follow instructions, and one because of a computer error.  Therefore, all analyses were 
based on the remaining 200 subjects (101 females, 96 males, 3 did not report their sex).  
The experiment used a 2 (test type: initial test vs. no initial test) X 2 (postevent 
information: control vs. misinformation) between-subjects design, with 50 subjects 
included in each condition. 
Materials and Procedure.  The materials and procedure for Experiment 2b were 
identical to those of Experiment 2a except that the lineup did not include the target.  The 
position of the six foils was randomized and whether a foil was presented with or without 
facial hair was also randomized. 
Results and Discussion  
Initial Test.  See Table 4 for initial test correct and misinformation recall probabilities.  
Baserate false recall probability was low in free recall (M = .06) and cued recall (M = 
.03).  
Lineup Identification.  Lineup identification data for Experiment 2b are presented in 
Table 9.  No significant interactions or main effects were found for no identification 
rates.  There was no significant benefit of initial testing for no identifications (i.e., correct 
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rejections).  In fact, no identifications were identical for the no initial test and initial test 
groups.  Very few studies have examined verbal overshadowing in a target-absent lineup.  
Of the ones that did, the results are mixed, with two finding verbal overshadowing 
(Meissner, 2002, Experiment 1; Yu & Geiselman, 1993), two finding verbal facilitation 
(Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004; Memon & Rose, 2001), and one finding neither verbal 
overshadowing nor facilitation (Sauerland et al., 2008).  Unfortunately, the current 
experiment only adds to this confusing state of affairs.  It might be that the effects of 
initial testing on a subsequent target-absent lineup are not particularly robust.   
 
Table 9 
 Percentage of subjects making no identification, identifying a misleading foil and a 
control foil in Experiment 2b 
     
                                           
Postevent Initial Test           No              Identification        Identification       
Information Condition             Identification      of misinformation   of control foil              
 
 
Control No Initial Test      44           22      34   
Initial Test      44           34      22   
 
Misleading No Initial Test      50           42       8    
Initial Test      50           34       16  
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For misinformation identifications, there was a marginally significant interaction 
between initial testing and postevent information, χ²(1, N = 200) = 3.56, p = .06.  
Misinformation exposure increased misinformation identifications for the nontested 
subjects, but not for the 
tested subjects.  There were 
no significant main effects.   
The effect of RT on 
choosing rates was 
examined in a time-
boundary analysis (Figure 
3).   Compared to slower 
subjects (18%; N = 38), 
those responding within 20 
sec were more accurate 
(36%; N = 162), χ²(1, N = 
200) = 4.51, p = .03, φ = .15.  
Further, subjects who responded within 11 sec were less likely to choose a misleading 
foil (35%; N = 82) than those with longer response latencies (55%; N = 118), χ²(1, N = 
200) = 7.55, p < .01, φ = .19. 
Subjects who made no identification were shown the same lineup again and 
forced to make an identification.  See Table 10 for choosing rates in this forced-choice 
lineup.  There was a marginally significant main effect of testing for misinformation 
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Table 10 
 Percentage of subjects identifying a misleading foil and a control foil in the forced-
choice lineup in Experiment 2b 
     
Postevent Initial Test         Identification           Identification       
Information Condition        of misinformation    of control foil              
 
 
Control No Initial Test  (N = 22) 68         32    
Initial Test  (N = 22)     45         55 
 
Misleading No Initial Test  (N = 25)     64         36   
Initial Test  (N = 25)     48         52 
 
 
identifications, χ²(1, N = 94) = 3.50, p = .06, φ = .19.  That is, initial testing reduced the 
likelihood of selecting a misleading foil from 66% to 49%.  Total choosing rates in a 
biased lineup were also examined (see Table 11).  For total misinformation 
identifications, there was a significant interaction between initial testing and postevent  
information, χ²(1, N = 200) = 5.36, p = .02.  For nontested subjects, exposure to 
misinformation increased the probability that one would identify the misleading foils  
from 52% to 74%, χ²(1, N = 100) = 5.19, p = .02, φ = .23.  There was also a marginally 
significant testing benefit—for those who heard the misleading narrative, initial testing 
reduced the likelihood that a subject would choose a misleading foil (from 74% to 58%), 
χ²(1, N = 100) = 2.85, p = .09, φ = .17.  Although this effect was only marginally 
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significant, it has important applied implications that are discussed in the general 
discussion. 
 
Table 11 
 Percentage of subjects identifying a misleading foil and a control foil when the 
identification rates from the regular and forced-choice lineups were combined in 
Experiment 2b 
     
Postevent Initial Test          Identification  Identification 
Information Condition         of misinformation     of control foil           
 
Control No Initial Test        52          48   
Initial Test        55          45   
 
Misleading No Initial Test         74          26   
Initial Test        58          42   
 
 
Follow-up Questions.  Data for the follow-up questions are presented in Table 12.  
Subjects who were initially tested were more accurate at estimating the length of time the 
target’s face was visible (M = 13.15 s) than those who did not take an initial memory test 
(M = 9.64 s), t(198) = 2.98, p < .01, d = .42 (the target’s face had been in view for 15 s).   
Compared to subjects who correctly rejected the lineup, choosers rated the lineup as 
being less difficult (M = 5.70 versus 6.39; t(198) = 2.25, p = .02, d = .34) and claimed to 
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take less time on the lineup identification task (M = 5.32 versus 6.29; t(198) = 3.57, p < 
.01, d = .51).  
In a meta-analysis, Sporer, Penrod, Read, and Cutler (1995) found a positive 
relationship between confidence and accuracy (also see Brewer & Wells, 2006; Lindsay, 
Read, & Sharma, 1998).  In fact, eyewitness confidence is often treated as compelling 
evidence in court (Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2002).  Similar to these previous findings, 
the data from the target-present lineup showed a positive confidence-accuracy 
relationship.  However, in the target-absent lineup, subjects who correctly rejected the 
lineup were less confident (34%) and less willing to testify (23%) compared to those who 
were incorrect (58% and 35%), t(198) = 6.70, p < .01, d = .94, and t(198) = 2.96, p < .01, 
d = .42, respectively.  
Although witness confidence can be a deciding factor in courtroom decisions, previous 
research has indicated that certain factors, such as postidentification feedback, may 
inflate eyewitness confidence (Wells & Bradfield, 1998).  In the target-absent lineup of  
the current study, encountering misinformation increased subjects’ confidence in their 
lineup decision if they had not been tested (but no effects were found for tested subjects); 
this interaction, however, was only marginally significant, F(1, 196) = 3.02, p = .08, ηp2 = 
.02.  Surprisingly, subjects who heard the misleading narrative rated themselves as 
having a greater basis to make an identification (M = 4.56) than control subjects (M = 
4.03), t(198) = 2.05, p = .04, d = .29.  Moreover, subjects who chose a misleading foil 
rated the lineup as being easier (M = 5.54) compared to subject who did not select a 
misleading foil (M = 6.26), t(198) = 2.38, p = .02, d = .37. 
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Chapter 4. General Discussion 
The present study examined the effects of taking an initial memory test on later 
perpetrator descriptions and identifications when one encounters misleading information.  
Two important findings emerged from these experiments.  First, in both experiments, 
misinformation hindered performance on subsequent recall and identification tasks.  
Specifically, subjects who heard misinformation had lower accurate recall probabilities 
and higher false recall probabilities in Experiment 1.  Moreover, misinformation reduced 
correct identifications and increased misinformation identifications in the target-present 
lineup.  Second, initial testing had positive effects on later perpetrator descriptions and 
identifications.  Initial testing improved later accurate descriptions of the perpetrator and 
reduced later false recall in Experiment 1.  In Experiment 2, initial testing improved 
correct identifications in the target-present lineup and reduced misinformation 
identifications in the biased, target-present and target-present lineups.  This finding 
contradicts the RES effect.  I now discuss these main findings in detail.  
The Adverse Effects of Misleading Information 
The misinformation effect was found in Experiments 1 and 2a, thus replicating 
the findings of Loftus and Greene (1980; note, however, that Loftus and Greene 
examined misinformation effects in a target-absent lineup and the current study found a 
misinformation effect in the target-present condition).  Compared to subjects who heard 
the control narrative, mislead subjects in the target-absent lineup experiment who 
received no initial test were more confident in their selection and reported a greater 
willingness to testify.  Not only did encountering misinformation increase false recall 
  42 
 
probabilities and misinformation identifications and inflate eyewitness confidence, it also 
decreased correct identifications.   
Misinformation can be encountered anywhere (e.g., the news media or other 
witnesses).  Therefore, what is perhaps most alarming is that misinformation greatly 
reduced correct identifications in the target-present lineup.  Overall, correct 
identifications dropped from 30% in the control condition to a mere 14% in the 
misleading condition.  Another important finding was that misinformation reduced the 
benefits of initial testing in Experiment 2a.  Without misinformation, initial testing 
increased correct identifications by 17%, but when misinformation was presented, the 
testing benefit was reduced to 7%.  Therefore, misinformation can have damaging effects 
on eyewitness identification—even reducing the beneficial effects of initial testing.   
Given these findings, one may ask how the effects of misinformation can be 
minimized.  Providing people a warning about the credibility of a source can reduce, and 
even eliminate, the misinformation effect for events—especially when the warning is 
specific (Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Lindsay, 1990; Wright, 1993).  However, 
specific warnings are nearly impossible in the real-world.  Therefore, eyewitnesses 
should be wary of the sources of information they are exposed to.  That is, they should 
consider the validity of information provided by the news media or overheard from other 
witnesses at the scene of the crime.   
Another way to reduce eyewitness suggestibility for faces may be to change the 
type of lineup used.  Sequential lineups have been shown to reduce false positives 
compared to simultaneous lineups (see Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001, for 
review).  This is because in simultaneous lineups, people typically choose the person who 
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looks most like the perpetrator by making relative judgments.  In sequential lineups, 
however, people see one person at a time and are more likely to make an absolute 
judgment by comparing each person to their memory for the perpetrator.  Therefore, 
using a sequential lineup may reduce misinformation identifications.  Unfortunately, most 
law enforcement agencies in the United States still use the simultaneous lineup, 
according to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ; www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij).   
The Benefits of Initial Testing 
Experiment 1 showed that initial testing improved later correct descriptions of a 
face.  This finding is consistent with the extensive body of literature emphasizing the 
benefits of testing on memory retention.  Experiment 2a also revealed a benefit of initial 
testing for correct identifications in a target-present lineup.  Instead of finding verbal 
overshadowing, Experiment 2a showed verbal facilitation.  That is, taking an initial test 
increased later corrected identifications.  Perhaps more important for current purposes, 
however, is that initial testing reduced the harmful effects of misinformation.    
In Experiment 1, false recall probabilities dropped dramatically from 78% in the 
no initial test condition to 53% in the initial test condition.  In Experiments 2a and 2b, 
there was no such reduction in misinformation identifications in the first, unbiased lineup.  
However, when examining total output, the benefits of initial testing emerged.  For those 
who heard the misleading narrative, misinformation identifications dropped from 75% in 
the no initial test group to 58% in the initial test group (averaged across Experiments 2a 
and 2b).  Examining the effects of initial testing and misinformation in a biased lineup 
procedure has real-world implications.  Although reforms have been implemented in 
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Wisconsin, North Carolina, New Jersey, and several large cities, biased lineup 
administration is still common practice in most precincts (www.innocenceproject.org).  
The benefits of initial testing on witness memory for people are clear from these 
data.  Intriguingly, this pattern seems to contradict those reported by Chan et al. (2009), 
who found that testing increased eyewitness suggestibility.  Why, then, did the current 
experiments result in a testing benefit instead of retrieval-enhanced suggestibility?  I 
propose two possible explanations for these disparate findings.  First, the materials and 
procedure used in the current experiments differed from those utilized by Chan and 
colleagues.  Second, faces and events are processed differently.  Therefore, the effects of 
testing and misinformation may be different for memory for faces, relative to events, 
because of this processing difference.   
There is an obvious difference in materials used in the current experiments 
relative to those used by Chan and colleagues (2009).  Chan et al.’s witnessed event 
lasted ~40 min whereas the current study’s event lasted 45 s.  For a drawn out 40 min 
event, Chan et al. found little forgetting between the event video and the final test, and so 
initial testing did not produce a significant testing effect.  But when an eyewitness event 
is very short, an initial test may be more effective at protecting against forgetting and 
misinformation because better encoded information is typically less susceptible to 
misinformation (Loftus, 1979a; Marche, 1999).  Further, the current study used 
instructions to promote incidental encoding of the critical event; Chan et al. specifically 
told subjects that they would take a test over their memory for the video.  Intentional 
encoding instructions may increase the likelihood of rehearsal.  Taking these two factors 
into consideration, it is not surprising that a significant testing effect was not found in 
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Chan et al.’s study.  In contrast, a significant testing effect was found in Experiment 1, 
suggesting that initial testing had enhanced retention of the fleeting witnessed event.  
Another difference was the instructions given to subjects for the audio narrative.  The 
instructions used mirrored those from Loftus and Greene (1980) in which the 
experimenter told subjects that the narrative was written by a professor.  This may have 
acted as a warning for tested subjects.  Tested subjects were well aware of the difficulty 
of the initial test and therefore may have put little trust into the memory of another 
witness.   
Despite the different materials used in the present study compared to those 
utilized by Chan et al. (2009), the main purpose was to determine whether the RES effect 
would generalize to faces, and not whether RES would occur with a shorter event video 
and incidental encoding instructions.  Memory for faces could react differently to testing 
and misinformation than memory for events because faces and events are processed 
differently.  As mentioned in the introduction, faces are thought to be processed 
holistically whereas events are processed sequentially.  Although holistic processing 
appears to be an efficient method for remembering and recognizing faces, Wilford and 
Wells (2010) recently found that holistic processing has one striking disadvantage.  
Namely, people are poorer at localizing changes to a person’s face than to other objects 
such as houses.  When subjects saw a face that had been altered (e.g., with a different 
nose), they were better at detecting that a change had occurred, but were worse at 
detecting what had changed about the face, relative to altered houses.  This finding 
suggests that holistic processing, relative to featural processing, impairs subjects’ ability 
to pinpoint what had changed between two faces.   
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Relating this finding to the current study, subjects who had been tested initially 
may have been better at localizing the change than those who had not taken an initial test.  
When subjects took the initial test, they were forced to break the face down into 
component parts (i.e., they described the eyes, nose, mouth, etc.).  This may have allowed 
them to localize the change in the misleading faces (i.e., the facial hair) better because 
their memory of the target face incorporated both a holistic and a featural representation.  
With both a holistic and featural representation in mind, tested subjects might have an 
advantage in rejecting the misleading detail in the narrative and the misinformation faces 
in the lineup.  Without the initial test, the memory for the face might have been preserved 
in a holistic format that made localization of change difficult.   Indeed, because of the 
short duration of the critical event and the incidental encoding instructions, this holistic 
representation of the perpetrator may have been particularly difficult to recover for the 
nontested subjects. 
Concluding Remarks 
Attempts were made to make the current study resemble real-life eyewitness 
situations.  For example, the eyewitness event was something that a student may actually 
witness—a theft in the library.  Moreover, the format of the questioning was analogous to 
how an investigator might question a witness (i.e., free recall followed by probing 
questions).  However, some aspects of the study may limit the generalizability of the 
results.  For example, the delay was only 30 min between initial retrieval and the final 
recall/recognition test.  Such a short delay is unlikely for real-life eyewitness events.  In 
fact, it may take weeks or even months for police investigators to apprehend a suspect 
and put together a lineup.  Future experiments may examine how a longer delay affects 
  47 
 
lineup identification in the current paradigm.  But because testing tends to protect against 
long-term forgetting, it is likely that greater testing benefits would emerge (see Chan & 
Langley, 2011, among others). 
In sum, the current study provided further evidence of verbal facilitation.  More 
importantly, the current study uncovered a new and surprising finding given RES: initial 
testing reduces suggestibility for faces.  This was true in both recall and in biased-lineup 
identifications.  The present study has identified an important boundary condition for 
RES.  Though, one needs to be cautious about the generality of this boundary condition 
because it is unclear whether the effect would persist with different instructions for the 
audio narrative, and for a longer witnessed event with intentional encoding instructions.   
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Footnotes 
1 The principal component analysis was used to develop a single WMC score based on all 
the WMC tasks combined.  
2 In a biased lineup procedure, witnesses are not told that the perpetrator may or may not 
be included in the lineup and are not told that choosing no person is an option. 
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Appendix A 
Demographic questionnaire used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
1. How old are you? 
2. What is your sex? 
3. What is your race/ethnicity? 
4. How many years of secondary education have you completed (including your current 
year)? 
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Appendix B 
Free recall instructions for the initial test in both experiments and the final test in 
Experiment 1. 
You will now type a detailed description of the man in the video that stole the wallet and 
laptop.  Please try and be as detailed as possible in your description.  Try and describe his 
clothing, hair, eyes, nose, mouth, and any other distinguishing features.  You will have 5 
minutes to type in your description.  If you finish before the 5 minutes is up, try to picture 
him in your mind and see if you can remember any other details.  If you have any 
questions, please ask your experimenter now.  Otherwise, please let the experimenter 
know that you are ready to begin.    
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Appendix C 
Cued recall questions and the correct answers. If answer has more than one correct 
response, only one was necessary to be scored as correct. Only question 8 was scored 
for misinformation recall.  
1. What color was the man's shirt? [Correct Answer: Black] 
2. What color were the man’s pants? [Correct Answer: Gray] 
3. Approximately how tall was he? [Correct Answer: 5’10’’; response must be 
within 2 inches to be scored as correct] 
4. Approximately how much did he weigh? [Correct Answer: 165 pounds; response 
must be within 10 pounds to be scored as correct] 
5. What color was his hair? [Correct Answer: Brown, dirty blonde] 
6. Briefly describe his hairstyle. [Correct Answer: Short, buzz-cut] 
7. What shape would you say his face was? (i.e., round, oval, square, heart-shaped, 
etc.) [Correct Answer: Oval] 
8. Describe any distinguishing characteristics that he may have had. [Correct 
Answer: No distinguishing characteristics; Misinformation: facial hair, mole] 
9. Briefly describe his eyes (i.e., color, size, shape). [Correct Answer: Blue] 
10. Briefly describe his nose (i.e., size, shape). [Correct Answer: Thin bridge, 
rounded tip] 
11. Briefly describe his mouth (i.e., shape, thickness). [Correct Answer: Thin to 
average lips] 
12. Describe any other details you can remember about what he looks like. [Item was 
not scored] 
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Appendix D 
The audio narrative scripts used in the present experiments. All three narratives were 
used in Experiment 1. Only the Control Narrative and the Facial Hair Narrative were 
used in Experiment 2. The misinformation is in italics. 
Control Narrative 
 
“A man walked into the room after a student had left and stole the student’s laptop and 
wallet. He was wearing a long-sleeved, black shirt and gray cargo pants. He was of 
average build. He was about 5 foot 10 and weighed approximately 165 pounds. I got a 
pretty good look at his face. He had short, brown hair and blue eyes. He had no real 
distinguishing features. He had a pretty average face.”  
 
Facial Hair Narrative  
 
“A man walked into the room after a student had left and stole the student’s laptop and 
wallet. He was wearing a long-sleeved, black shirt and gray cargo pants. He was of 
average build. He was about 5 foot 10 and weighed approximately 165 pounds. I got a 
pretty good look at his face. He had short, brown hair and blue eyes. His only real 
distinguishing feature was that he had some facial hair—just some hair on his chin. He 
had a pretty average face.” 
 
Mole Narrative  
 
“A man walked into the room after a student had left and stole the student’s laptop and 
wallet. He was wearing a long-sleeved, black shirt and gray cargo pants. He was of 
average build. He was about 5 foot 10 and weighed approximately 165 pounds. I got a 
pretty good look at his face. He had short, brown hair and blue eyes. His only real 
distinguishing feature was that he had a mole on his left cheek. He had a pretty average 
face.” 
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Appendix E 
 
Sample target-present lineup and instructions for the lineup identification task in 
Experiment 2.  
“Type the number of the photo of the person that you believe to be the man who stole the 
wallet and laptop in the video. If none of the photos match the person you saw, type "N" 
for none.” 
                     
                                    
   1    2    3 
 
                                  
  4    5    6 
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Appendix F 
Foil photos used in the lineup identification task in Experiment 2.  The top row 
includes the original photos; the bottom row includes the altered photos. 
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Appendix G 
Follow-up questions from Experiment 2. Bracketed words are a reference to the items 
in Tables 8 and 12. 
1. How good of a view did you get of the perpetrator? Rate from 1 (very poor) to 9 
(very good)  [Goodness of view] 
2. How many seconds would you estimate that the perpetrator's face was in view?  
[Seconds target’s face was in view] 
3. How well were you able to make out specific features of his face from the video?  
[Ability to make out facial features] 
4. What would you estimate was the distance (in feet) between the camera-eye view 
and the perpetrator's face?  [Distance from camera] 
5. How much attention were you paying to his face while viewing the video? Rate 
from 1 (none) to 9 (my total attention).  [Attention paid to target’s face] 
6. At the time that you identified the person in the photospread, how certain were 
you that the person you identified from the photos was the man that stole the 
wallet and laptop from the video? Rate your confidence from 0 - 100% confident.  
[Confidence in lineup decision] 
7. How easy or difficult was it for you to figure out which person in the photos was 
the perpetrator? Rate from 1 (extremely easy) to 9 (extremely difficult). [Difficulty 
of the lineup] 
8. After you were first shown the photos, how long do you estimate it took you to 
make an identification? Rate from 1 (I needed almost no time to pick him out) to 9 
(I had to look at the photos for a long time to pick him out).  [Time spent making 
a decision] 
9. On the basis of your memory, how willing would you be to testify in court that 
the person you identified was the man in the video? Rate your willingness from 0 
- 100% willing to testify.  [Willingness to testify] 
10. Assume that an eyewitness had about the same view of the perpetrator that you 
had from the video. Do you think that an identification by this eyewitness ought 
to be trusted? Rate from 1 (definitely should not be trusted) to 9 (definitely should 
be trusted).  [Trust in another witness’ decision] 
  64 
 
11. To what extent do you feel that you had a good basis (enough information) to 
make an identification? Rate from 1 (no basis at all) to 9 (a very good basis).  
[Basis to make a decision] 
 
